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1 Introduction 
1.1 Ship breaking 
Nowadays, around 90% of world trade is carried out by the shipping industry.1 Global maritime 
trade reached 10.7 billion tons in 2018.2 The question arises: Where do all these ships go at the 
end of their life? The answer is: After their life span of 20 to 30 years3 vessels are scrapped, 
mostly in environmentally highly questionable conditions. Ships contain, besides non-
problematic materials like furniture, a variety of hazardous materials such as polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCB), heavy metals, oils, anti-fouling agent hull paints containing tributyl tin or 
even radioactive substances. 4  Unfortunately, 90% of scrapping continues to take place in 
developing countries using the so-called beaching method5 allowing pollutants to seep into the 
coastal and marine environment. Beaching means that a ship is driven up on the beach as high 
as possible at full power until it is firmly aground.6 The vessel is then taken apart by workers 
with gas torches and, as the ship is lightened, it is towed progressively further inshore, while 
liquids are discharged on the beaches and in the sea, and wastes are burned on the beach.7 
Processes to scrap ships without letting harmful substances disperse into the marine 
environment do exist, applying sustainable waste management and appropriate dismantling 
techniques for those hazardous materials.8 However, those methods are much more expensive 
than just driving a ship onto an Asian beach where it is taken apart by workers paid close to 
nothing and without strict environmental provisions in place.  
It is important to work out the main actors of the industry. What seems especially problematic 
is how the beaching practice is especially widespread among vessels owned by EU nationals 
(EU ship owners/ EU owners): German owners for example beached 74% of their vessels in 
2015 while the number for Greek owners at 87% is even higher.9 The ship breaking itself then 
                                               
1 International Chamber of Shipping, Shipping and World Trade (25.03.2020), available at https://www.ics-
shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade. 
2 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2018, UNCTAD/RMT/2018 (2018), X.  
3 Barua, S; Rahman I; Mosharraf, M ‘Environmental Hazards associated with open-beach breaking of end-of-life 
ships: a review.’ (2018) Environmental Science and Pollution Research 25, 30881. 
4 Hillyer, H. ‘The Hard Reality of Breaking Up: The Global Transboundary Movement of Ocean Vessel 
Demolition and Waste.’ (2012) Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 13, 763. 
5 Barua, Rahman, Mosharraf, n 3, 30881. 
6 Galley, M. Shipbreaking: Hazards and Liabilities (Springer International Publishing Cham 2014), 11. 
7 Ibid, 11-12. 
8 Barua, Rahman, Mosharraf, n 3, 30881. 
9 European Commission, ‘Thematic Issue: Ship recycling: reducing human and environmental impacts’ (2016) 
Science for Environment Policy 55, 3. 
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happens in the developing world at substandard ship breaking yards, with substantial impacts: 
Samples taken by the ship scrapping site in Alang, India showed unbelievable numbers of up 
to 16973% higher levels of heavy metals and petroleum hydrocarbons in both sediment and 
seawater than in comparable areas, as well as high concentration of harmful bacteria. 10 
Additionally, high amounts of microplastic were found close to the yard.11  
An uncomfortable truth comes to show: With EU law makers watching, EU ship owners operate 
vessels for decades, profiting greatly. As soon as the profit margins decrease, there are no 
qualms to sail those vessels full of asbestos and oil on a developing country’s beach destroying 
their environment, and even making money from it in the process. 
In this thesis, two terms will be used to distinguish between responsible methods (ship 
recycling) and irresponsible harmful methods in sub-standard yards (ship breaking). 
1.2 How disguising tactics come into play 
The subject of ship breaking is not a legal void. There have been both national and international 
regulations in place on the matter applicable to EU owners, such as the 1989 Basel Convention12 
or European law such as the Ship Recycling Regulation (EU SRR).13 As will be shown in this 
thesis, the framework on ship breaking is at times vague and obligations are weak. But even 
where legislation is in place, EU owners have been successfully circumventing laws by 
disguising their intents or using flags of convenience (FOC).14 Under international law every 
ship must be registered with a flag State, which is responsible for ensuring that the vessel’s 
condition, manning and operation comply with both national law and any international treaties 
to which the State is a party.15 In theory this is supposed to lead to effective enforcement on all 
ships even when navigating areas under no State’s sovereignty. However, reality looks 
different. The majority of vessels is not registered in the countries of the owners but rather in 
countries of ‘open registries”16 where requirements to be registered are often low. As of 1 
                                               
10 Ibid, 9-10. 
11 Ibid, 12. 
12 The Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal of 22 
March 1989 (1673 UNTS. 126). 
13 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on ship 
recycling. 
14 Puthucherril, TG. From ship breaking to sustainable ship recycling: evolution of a legal regime (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2010), 51. 
15 Galley, M. ‘Flagging interest: ship registration, owner anonymity and sub-standard shipping.’ (2013) 
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies 14, 1. 
16 Negret, C. ‘Pretending to be Liberian and Panamanian; Flags of Convenience and the Weakening of the 
Nation State on the High Seas.’ (2016) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 47, 4. 
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January 2018, the top three flags of registration were Panama, Marshall Islands and Liberia,17 
none of which are under the top 35 owners of world fleet.18  On the other hand, German 
operators for example, as the fourth biggest owner of world fleet, owned 2869 vessels, of which 
only 319 (11%) were registered in Germany.19 While EU ship owners control more than 40% 
of the world fleet, only 22% of vessels fly an EU member State flag.20 Nearing the end of their 
life, the share decreases even more: only 7.7% of beached ships were still registered under an 
EU flag when they were wrecked.21 EU owners go to great lengths to evade applicable rules. 
Notable in this respect is a statement from an official of the European Commission regarding 
the case:  
Spain as the presumptive country of export is in the best position to take further 
measures (…). The EU or Commission can only play a limited role in this context.22  
Even where international regulations are in place their enforcement is uncertain and dependent 
upon national regimes and mechanisms. 
1.3 Objective and research questions 
This thesis assesses the international regulatory framework applicable to the real generators of 
waste, EU ship owners, and how to prevent them from evading obligations on ship breaking. 
The author will start by assessing the framework on ship breaking and its shortcomings. In the 
next step she will examine how FOCs come into play. Further, the author will offer solutions 
for identified legal shortcomings. It will be assessed how the legal framework on ship breaking 
should be changed to prevent EU ship owners from breaking the vessels in sub-standard 
breaking yards. Further, it will be discussed how the legal framework around FOCs should be 
changed to prevent EU owners from reflagging and circumventing otherwise applicable rules. 
This leads to the following overarching topic: What is the legal situation around ship breaking 
for EU ship owners and what changes are necessary to make the industry more environmentally 
friendly? The topic is broken down into the following research questions: 
• What is the current regulatory framework at the global and EU level on ship breaking 
applicable to vessels owned by EU nationals? 
• Which shortcomings can be identified in this framework? 
                                               
17 UNCTAD, n 2, 35. 
18 Ibid, 30. 
19 Ibid. 
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• How do disguising and reflagging practices by EU ship owners play into the issue of 
ship breaking? 
• What could be possible solutions to address identified shortcomings in the international 
regulatory framework on ship breaking and the disguising and reflagging practices by 
EU ship owners? 
 a) How should the framework be changed to prevent environmentally damaging 
practices in ship breaking vessels owned by EU nationals? 
b) How can the circumvention of existing rules by disguising and reflagging practices 
by EU owners be prevented? 
1.4 Scope 
The chosen topic is a very broad subject and exceeds the size limitations of an LL.M. thesis if 
discussed in its entirety. First and foremost, this is a thesis about environmental issues in the 
domain of the law of the sea. As such, all legal issues regarding human rights or labour law, 
and the highly problematic situation of workers in breaking yards, are excluded. The research 
will focus on the direct effects caused by the breaking process to the marine environment and 
how those can be addressed. The paper will not include a discussion regarding damage caused 
on land. For the same reason, the issue of invasive alien species23 carried by vessels coming 
from all over the world is not covered. Importantly, the thesis will only assess the situation of 
owners who are national to EU member States and not cover other big originators of end-
of-life ships as for example US American owned cruise ship companies. 
1.5 Structure 
The work consists of five main parts. After an introduction in Chapter 1 Chapter 2 will discuss 
the international regulatory framework of ship breaking applicable to EU owners and assess its 
shortcomings. Chapter 3 will then go on to highlight the issues around evasion tactics such as 
FOC and how they relate to ship breaking. Chapter 4 will propose (mostly) juridical solutions 
to the shortcomings assessed in Chapters 2 and 3. The thesis will end with a conclusion and an 
outlook in Chapter 5. 
                                               
23 Hillyer, n 4, 763. 
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1.6 Methodology and Sources 
The author will mostly use a legal doctrinal approach of ‘black-letter analysis” when 
assessing legal sources with both descriptive and analytical methods. She will start with 
examining the existing law regarding the subject in accordance with the rules of international 
law based on articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties24. The main 
sources used will be international conventions, which are a primary source of international law 
according to article 38 ICJ Statute25, and EU law. When interpreting them, especially when 
identifying the gaps in the framework, the author also relies upon subsidiary sources of law 
according to article 38 ICJ Statute such as journal articles and books of legal scholars, reports 
and judicial decisions.  
  
                                               
24 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (1155 UNTS 332). 
25 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Annex to the UN Charter of 26 June 1945 (1 UNTS XVI). 
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2 The international regulatory framework of ship breaking 
applicable to EU owners 
2.1 Global regime 
Firstly, the global framework on shipbreaking will be discussed. While there is no international 
agreement in force specifically on shipbreaking multiple international agreements play a role. 
2.1.1 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
While the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea26 (LOSC) does not cover ship breaking as 
such multiple provisions touch the subject. The LOSC lays down ground rules on flag, coastal 
and port State jurisdiction throughout the text, such as in articles 56, 94 or 211 (3) LOSC. 
Further, there are the environmental obligations of States, such as the general obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment in article 192 LOSC. Those general obligations 
are further specified by articles 207 and 210 LOSC on pollution from land and by dumping.  
2.1.1.1 Land-based source pollution 
According to article 207 LOSC States shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures 
regarding pollution from land-based sources, taking into account internationally agreed rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures, while they shall harmonize their policies 
and cooperate globally and regionally. The term «pollution» is defined in article 1 (1)(4) LOSC 
as the 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances (…) into the marine 
environment (…) which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to 
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health (and) impairment of quality 
for use of sea water.  
Article 207 LOSC also covers accidental and indirect pollution.27 The beaching process, taking 
apart vessels on the beach and letting oil and other substances seep into sediment and sea, falls 
under the definition. However, the provision hardly helps to prevent harmful shipbreaking 
practices. In cases of pollution from land-based sources the LOSC obliges States to take 
measures regarding the matter, and according to article 213 LOSC, States shall enforce those 
                                               
26 Convention on the Law of the Sea, of December 10 1982 (1833 UNTS 397). 
27 Wacht, F. ‘Article 207’ in A Proelss (ed.), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A 
Commentary (Hart Publishing 2017), 1380. 
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laws. This is where the issue lies. The right (and obligation) to control pollution from land-
based sources lies completely in the hands of the coastal State28 – which in this case is the State 
conducting and profiting from the shipbreaking industry. Article 207 LOSC does not provide 
specific duties and leaves great leeway for States to only offer a weak framework. Developing 
States relying on the industry are highly unlikely to enforce strict environmental rules on 
breaking yards. Mostly, major ship breaking countries have not enacted measures.29 Moreover, 
when India tried to establish national regulation, this led to ship owners finding alternate 
locations in Bangladesh instead of a more environmentally friendly industry. India for example 
imposed certifications ensuring that oil tankers are cleaned of residues before being scrapped. 
The industry then just migrated to locations with less rules.30 
2.1.1.2 Dumping 
According to art. 210 LOSC States shall adopt measures regarding dumping. The definition of 
dumping is found in art. 1(1)(5)(a) LOSC and means 
any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms 
or other man-made structures at sea [or] any deliberate disposal of vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea. 
It is questionable if the beaching of vessels falls under the provision. The practice of beaching 
falls under the scope of land-based source pollution as regulated in art. 207 LOSC: Land-based 
source pollution is a generic term and covers a wide variety of human activities such as, among 
others, industrial sources.31 This raises the question: Can something that is land-based pollution 
also be dumping at the same time? The issue has been addressed by the IMO Legal Affairs and 
Relations Division regarding the disposal via land-based pipelines. It argued that there was no 
clear borderline between the scopes of the two articles and mutual exclusiveness was not 
indicated.32 
The author however disagrees. The LOSC distinguishes clearly between ‘dumping’ (art. 210) 
and ‘pollution from land-based sources’ (art. 207). The reason for this lies in the role of coastal 
States: important industries are located on the coast, possibly discharging pollutants into the 
                                               
28 Puthucherril, n 14, 192. 
29 Ibid, 117. 
30 Pelsy, F. ‘The Blue Lady Case and the International Issue of Ship Dismantling.’ (2008) Law, Environment and 
Development Journal 4, 137. 
31 Wacht, n 27, 1380. 
32 Ibid, p 1413; IMO, ‘Interpretation of the London Convention and Protocol’, IMO Doc. LC 37/9/2 (2015). 
Annex, paras. 3 et seq. 
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marine environment. Regulating land-based pollution would cause severe restrictions of 
activities on the coastal States’ sovereign territory, which is why coastal States are hesitant to 
implement a strict regime. The situation for coastal States on land-based pollution is therefore 
different than for dumping at sea – while States might be willing to submit themselves to rules 
on dumping at sea, the situation of pollution from the coastline is a different regime which 
interferes with territorial sovereignty. 33  Therefore, a clear distinction between land-based 
pollution and dumping must be made. Additionally, the focus must be put on the fact that 
beaching is not conducted at sea but rather by an industry on the beach. For these reasons ship 
breaking making use of the beaching method does not fall under art. 210 LOSC.  
2.1.2 London Dumping Convention and Protocol 
The 1972 London Convention34 is one of the first global conventions for the environmental 
protection from human activities, trying to prevent marine pollution by dumping of wastes and 
other matter. 87 States are parties.35 The Convention defines dumping as  
any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter [and] vessels.36  
In 1996 a Protocol to the Convention37 was adopted, replacing the original version for its 
parties.38 The Protocol changed the Convention to the reverse listing approach so that dumping 
is generally prohibited unless allowed. 39  It is possible to be party to either the London 
Convention, or the Protocol, or both. The issue of shipbreaking in the context of the London 
Convention and Protocol raises the question if the Convention is applicable.  
Does Beaching fall under the London Conventio and Protocol? 
When the Convention and Protocol were developed, ship breaking was not discussed which 
opens the question if it falls under the provisions.40 Similar to the LOSC the question must be 
asked: Can something that is land-based pollution also be dumping? The Protocol ‘takes into 
account’ the LOSC in its preamble which is why the LOSC’s valuations are transferred to the 
                                               
33 Wacht, n 27, 1318. 
34 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 13 November 
1972. 
35 IMO, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(02.06.2020), available at http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/default.aspx. 
36 Art. III(1)(a) London Convention. 
37 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter of 
7 November 1996. 
38 Puthucherill, n 14, 124. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Galley, n 6, 73. 
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Convention and Protocol. As discussed above land-based source pollution and dumping are 
exclusive to each other. The Convention and Protocol are therefore not applicable. Furthermore, 
according to the Convention and Protocol’s definition, dumping must be deliberate. However, 
the intent of ship breaking is to reuse the parts and sell them, they are not per se thrown in the 
sea. Virtually all parts of the ship are reused.41 Most pollution is a side-effect of the breaking 
operations, such as the release of chemicals like PCB when burning plastic coated wires to 
recover copper,42 and therefore not deliberate. 
The Convention and Protocol offer provisions on the disposal of vessels. However, they do not 
include the process of beaching which is therefore not regulated. 
2.1.3 Basel Convention and the Waste Shipment Regulation 
Another instrument which influences ship breaking is the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. In the 1980s awareness 
of problematic practices regarding wastes grew: Headlines on practices such as the dumping of 
eight thousand drums of chemical waste on a Nigerian beach resulted in international outrage43 
and led to the conclusion of the 1989 Basel Convention. With 187 parties it covers most of the 
world, including the European Union. The Convention aims to protect human health and 
environment from hazardous wastes and has three main goals: the reduction of generation and 
the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes, restrictions on their 
transboundary movements, and the regulation of transboundary movement if permissible.44 In 
1995, an amendment to the Convention, the ‘Basel ban’ was adopted and incorporated in the 
Convention as art. 4A: 
Each Party listed in Annex VII shall prohibit all transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes which are destined for operations according to Annex IV A, to 
States not listed in Annex VII. 
Parties listed in Annex VII are according to the Annex 
                                               
41 Puthucherril, n 14, 15. 
42 Ibid, 17. 
43 Pitman, T, Ivory Coast’s toxic tragedy a lesson for others (08.06.2020), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15319791/ns/world_news-world_environment/t/ivory-coasts-toxic-tragedy-lesson-
others/#.X13OOWczbeQ.  
44 Secreteriat of the Basel Convention, Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (08.06.2020), available at 
http://www.basel.int/?tabid=4499#EU. 
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Parties and other States which are members of OECD, EC, Liechtenstein. 
The Amendment has been in force since December 2019 and counts 98 parties.45 Much earlier, 
in 1997, such ban was incorporated in EU legislation in the Waste Shipment Regulation (EU 
WSR),46 legally binding all member States. Its key element is the ban of shipment of all waste 
outside EFTA countries in article 34: 
1. All exports of waste from the Community destined for disposal shall be 
prohibited. 
2.  The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to exports of waste destined for 
disposal in EFTA countries which are also Parties to the Basel Convention. 
It must be discussed if and how this framework applies to shipbreaking. This thesis focusses on 
vessels owned by EU owners that are taken apart in shipbreaking yards in Bangladesh, India 
and Pakistan, which are all parties to the Basel Convention 47  and non-OECD/ EFTA 
countries.48 
Are end-of-life ships waste? 
The question in this context is if vessels from the EU that are exported to Asian breaking yards 
are considered hazardous waste: Does the Basel Convention apply to end-of-life ships? The 
answer to this is of practical importance since an affirmative answer would mean that the 
exporting States would be obliged to prevent the departure of the vessels.49 According to art. 
2(1) wastes are 
 substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended [or] required to be disposed 
of by the provisions of national law. 
Art. 1(1)(a) describes hazardous wastes as wastes contained in Annex I, as long as not excluded 
by Annex 3, or wastes that are defined as hazardous by the party of export, import or transit. 
                                               
45 Secreteriat of the Basel Convention, Amendment to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (09.06.2020), available at 
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/BanAmendment/tabid/1344/Default.aspx. 
46 Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments 
of waste. 
47 Secreteriat of the Basel Convention, n 43. 
48 OECD, List of OECD Member countries - Ratification of the Convention on the OECD (15.06.2020), available 
at https://www.oecd.org/about/document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm 
49 Albers, J. ‘Responsibility and Liability in the Context of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes by 
Sea. Existing Rules and the 1999 Liability Protocol to the Basel Convention.’ (2014) International Max Planck 
Research School (IMPRS) for Maritime Affairs. University of Hamburg. PhD, 104. 
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Among others, Annex I lists waste substances and articles containing PCBs and wastes having 
copper, zinc or asbestos as constituents, all of which are found in old vessels.50 The important 
question is: When is a ship «hazardous waste»? A vessel is, according to the definition, waste, 
if and when it is disposed of or intended to be disposed of. Old ships are hazardous as they 
contain a multitude of hazardous materials. The beaching of a ship is the «accumulation of 
material intended for operations which may lead to resource recovery» as listed in Annex IV of 
the Basel Convention and therefore waste.  
At the point when a vessel is beached, however, the vessel in question was already sold to and 
has arrived at the Asian shipbreaking yard and its ‘transboundary movement’ according to 
article 2(3) Basel Convention is finished. The point when a port State could have stopped the 
export passed. The important question is if a vessel can be seen as waste before it is beached, 
and when it is still in the vicinity of the State of export. That would be the case if the vessel was 
‘intended to be disposed of’. The point in time at which a ship can be considered waste becomes 
crucial.  
At this point it is important to go into the process of ship disposal. When a ship is at the end of 
its life the ship owner is not the one that sells and eventually exports the vessel to the 
shipbreaking facilities. Rather, the ship is first sold to a ‘cash buyer’ who subsequently sells the 
vessel to a breaking yard.51 The cash buyer is usually national to a country which is not bound 
by the export ban of the Convention: The three biggest cash-buyers who control 2/3 of the 
market are in the non-OECD countries Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore.5253 
The industry’s point of view 
It is argued, by mostly the side of the shipping industry, that selling a vessel to a cash buyer 
cannot constitute the intent to dispose it and therefore the vessel is not waste at this point. 
According to that view the sale’s purpose is the sale itself and its profit, not the ship’s disposal. 
It is further said that a vessel can only be qualified as waste when it is not supposed to sail 
anymore54 – how could a fully functioning, certified and insured ship, even carrying cargo on 
its last journey55 be qualified as waste? If that was the case the vessel would have two contrary 
purposes at the same time. This view concludes that there is no intent to dispose the vessel when 
                                               
50 Hillyer, n 4, 763. 
51 NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Cash Buyers (12.06.2020), available at 
https://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/our-work/the-problem/cash-buyers/ 
52 Ibid. 
53 OECD, n 48. 
54 Galley, n 6, 63. 
55 Ibid, p 65. 
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selling the ship to a cash buyer but rather only when the vessel is beached already. Further, as 
long as the ship is still sailing its purpose is to sail and it cannot constitute waste at the same 
time. According to those arguments the Basel Convention is not applicable.  
A more convincing argumentation 
There is, however, an opposing, more convincing, view on the subject, advocated by for 
example the NGO Shipbreaking Platform.56 First of all, the argument that a ship cannot be 
waste and a ship at the same time cannot hold up. One must keep in mind that things are not 
only waste when they are out of order – there are manifold reasons to dispose an object other 
than that it’s out of function: they could be of an economic nature or because a newer object 
has replaced the old one. Those cases must be covered under the provisions. The literal 
interpretation of art. 2(1) Basel Convention supports this: focus must be put on the intention of 
the owner, not external circumstances. In line with these arguments the 7th Basel Conference 
of Parties noted the following: 
a ship may become waste as defined in article 2 of the Basel Convention and that 
at the same time it may be defined as a ship under other international rules.57 
The other argument that the sellers’ intent is only the sale itself, not the disposal, must also be 
debunked. It fails to see the actual reason for selling the vessels: The cash-buyers’ sole business 
is the further sale of the vessel to a breaking yard. The only reason for owners not to sell the 
vessel to the breaking yard directly is that they are legally prohibited to do so under the Basel 
Convention or EU WSR. The aim is to get rid of the ship and the owners are aware where it is 
going. The purpose of the Basel Convention is to hinder transboundary movement of hazardous 
waste – if it is transported to a cash-buyer whose only purpose it is to sell and bring it to a 
breaking yard or sold to the breaking yard directly cannot make a difference. Therefore, 
according to the view represented in this paper, the Basel Convention is applicable to end-of-
life ships which are sold to cash buyers. Therefore, States are, according to articles 4(e) and 4A 
Basel Convention and article 34 EU WSR for EU flagged vessels, obligated to prevent sales to 
the cash buyers, as the intent of disposal is already given at the time of the sale. This is supported 
by for example the case of the Sandrien, which was the first court ruling that a ship was 
                                               
56 NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Basel Convention (15.06.2020), available at 
https://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/issues-of-interest/the-law/basel-convention/. 
57 7th Basel Conference of Parties, Decision VII/26 (2004), 4;  
CIEL, Orellana, MA; Azoulay, D; Bratrschovsky, K., Legality of the EU Commission Proposal on Ship 
Recycling (2012), 4. 
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considered hazardous waste by the Council of State in the Netherlands in 2002 and led to the 
arrest of the vessel.58 That same year, Turkey was the first country that denied entry to the Sea-
Beirut based on the finding that it was hazardous waste.59 
Non-applicability to EU flagged vessels 
It is important to note that while the Basel Convention and EU WSR are applicable to end-of-
life ships they do not apply to vessels flying an EU member State flag. The reason for that is 
article 27 EU SRR which added article 1(3)(i) to the EU WSR. It excludes EU flagged vessels 
from the scope of the EU WSR since the EU SRR as the more specific instrument shall be the 
applicable law in these cases, implementing the Hong Kong Convention (HKC)60 before it is 
even in force.61 In practice that means that while the EU WSR is not applicable when the vessel 
in question is flying an EU member State flag it continues to apply to EU port States. While 
this might be confusing at first, it must be kept in mind that the instruments have different 
approaches to jurisdiction: The provisions of Basel Convention and EU WSR apply to the port 
State, while the provisions of the EU SRR apply to the flag State, creating a partly overlap. The 
applicability of different instruments will be further discussed in the following paragraph and 
in chapter 2.3. 
An evaluation 
The Convention is applicable to end-of-life ships and offers a strong mechanism in form of an 
export ban. However, it has substantial loopholes. Firstly, even if it seems evident that the only 
intent to sell to a cash buyer is the disposal of the ship such intent is hard to prove when the 
owners claim the ship is sold for repair or further use.62 In many cases, EU waste shipment 
authorities could not prove the dismantling purpose and ships had to be released from custody.63 
Even more importantly, the provisions are easily circumvented for the following reason: The 
State that is obliged to prohibit the movement of waste is according to art. 2(10), (13), 4A Basel 
Convention the State of export, from which the  
                                               
58 Moen, A. ‘Breaking Basel: The elements of the Basel Convention and its application to toxic ships.’ (2008) 
Marine Policy 32, 1057. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships of 15 May 
2009. 
61 See below at 2.2.2. 
62 NGO Shipbreaking Platform, n 51. 
63 Ormond, T. ‘Hong Kong Convention and EU Ship Recycling Regulation: Can they change bad industrial 
practices soon?’ (2012) elni Review, 555. 
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transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes is planned to be 
initiated or is initiated 
or, according to article 2(22), 24 EU WSR the 
‘country of dispatch’ [meaning] any country from which a shipment of waste is 
planned to be initiated or is initiated. 
The only thing ship owner and buyer have to do is to conduct the sale and start the transit in an 
area beyond national jurisdiction64 or a country not bound by the amendment.65 In that case 
there is no State of export or dispatch and the Basel Convention or EU WSR are not applicable. 
This shows that while the Convention is theoretically applicable to sales to cash buyers its 
regulations are easily evaded. At this point it is important to note how the IMO started to 
develop the HKC66. The reason for that was the awareness of the international community that 
the framework, including the Basel Convention, does not sufficiently regulate the issues around 
ship breaking, and of the necessity to address the substantial gaps. This can be seen through the 
example of the Clemenceau, a French aircraft carrier which reached the end of her life. Since it 
was too expensive to recycle it in France’s own naval shipyard, the search for another final port 
began. France had to take the vessel back, after a Spanish company breached its contract by 
trying to take the ship to Turkey without removing toxic material. In 2005 the vessel left France, 
headed to Alang, India.67  
2.1.4 IMO Instruments 
2.1.4.1 Guidelines on ship recycling 
In 2003, IMO adopted their Guidelines on Ship Recycling.68 IMO guidelines are not legally 
binding but provide guidance on both legal and technical matters and have often led to the 
adoption of (legally binding) Conventions.69 In addition, the IMO, ILO and Basel Conference 
of Parties created a Joint ILO/IMO/Basel Convention Working Group on Ship Scrapping with 
                                               
64 Matz-Lück, N. ‘Safe and Sound Scrapping of ‘Rusty Buckets’? The 2009 Hong Kong Ship Recycling 
Convention.’ (2010) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 19, 100. 
65 NGO Shipbreaking Platform, n 51. 
66 Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships of 15 May 
2009. 
67 The American Society of International Law, Orellana, M, Shipbreaking and Le Clemenceau Row 
(15.06.2020), available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/10/issue/4/shipbreaking-and-le-clemenceau-row.  
68 IMO Assembly resolution, ‘IMO Guidelines on Ship Recycling’ IMO Doc. A 23/Res.962 (2003). 
69 Engels, UD. ‘European Ship Recycling Regulation. Entry-Into-Force Implications of the Hong Kong 
Convention’ (2013) International Max Planck Research School (IMPRS) for Maritime Affairs. University of 
Hamburg. PhD, 27. 
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the aim to examine their relevant guidelines and identify gaps and overlaps. 70  These 
developments eventually led to the IMO Diplomatic Conference on Ship Recycling in Hong 
Kong, instigated by the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee.71 
2.1.4.2 HKC 
The conference cumulated in the adoption of the HKC, the aim of which is to protect human 
health and the environment from harm caused by ship breaking.72 It is the first instrument 
addressing the issue of ship breaking as such. The Convention tries to solve the issues from 
multiple angles: it regulates not only the shipbreaking process at the end of the vessels’ life but 
also provides rules on the design, construction, operation and maintenance of ships, thus 
implementing a ‘cradle to grave’ approach.73 It consists of 21 main articles enumerating the 
basic principles for safe and environmentally sound ship recycling and an annex specifying the 
main technical requirements in 25 regulations.74 A key provision is regulation 4 which prohibits 
the installation or use of hazardous materials listed in Appendix 1. According to regulation 5 
each new ship shall have an Inventory of Hazardous Materials on board, which has to be 
updated during the ship’s operational life. Of special importance is regulation 8 which provides 
that  
Ships destined to be recycled shall: [only] be recycled at Ship Recycling Facilities 
that [are] authorized in accordance with this Convention75 
and 
certified as ready for recycling by the Administration or organization recognized 
by it, prior to any recycling activity taking place.76 
Furthermore regulations 15-23 stipulate standards the facilities must comply with.77 Important 
in this regard is regulation 17.1 which requires the facility to  
                                               
70 Ibid, 29f. 
71 Ibid, 33. 
72 IMO, The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships 
(23.06.2020), available at http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/The-Hong-
Kong-International-Convention-for-the-Safe-and-Environmentally-Sound-Recycling-of-Ships.aspx. 
73 Engels, n 69, 36. 
74 Puthucherril, n 14, 149. 
75 Regulation 8.1 HKC. 
76 Regulation 8.6 HKC. 
77 Engels, n 69, 38. 
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establish management systems, procedures and techniques […] which will prevent, 
reduce, minimize and to the extent practicable eliminate adverse effects on the 
environment caused by Ship Recycling. 
Regulations 19 and 20 then specify the facilities’ duties to protect the environment and the safe 
and environmentally sound management of hazardous materials. It is important to note that the 
Convention references the IMO’s guidelines throughout the text, which have to be taken into 
account when applying the HKC.78 There are six guidelines established in the IMO’s Marine 
Environment Protection Committee’s (MEPC) sessions between 2009 and 2012 on different 
matters,79 specifying the provisions of the Convention.80 
2.1.4.3 An Evaluation 
The HKC in general 
The provisions of the HKC approach the subject of shipbreaking in a comprehensive manner, 
starting with the construction of ships, their operation and maintenance and finishing with their 
disposal. The issue of hazardous materials is considered even before vessels become waste. The 
structure of the Convention, with the main text providing main objectives and procedures and 
the Annex going into technical details, allows flexibility and enables States to keep up with best 
technical and scientific practices.81  
There is, however, criticism towards the Convention. It is doubted if the instrument is able to 
offer more than procedural minimum standards.82 While there are provisions on inventories, 
certificates and authorizations, there is no ban of the highly problematic beaching practice.83 
Responsibilities lie with flag States and States operating ship recycling facilities.84 This gives 
them great leeway to keep hurtful practices of end-of-life ship disposal alive. There is no 
principle of prior informed consent as found in the Basel Convention.85  Additionally, the 
                                               
78 Regulations 5, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20 Annex to the HKC. 
79 The rules are on inventory, facilities, the ship recycling plan, authorisation, survey and certification and 
inspection of ships.  
Galley, n 6, 174. 
80 Ibid, 173. 
81 Matz-Lück, n 64, 100. 
82 Ibid, 99. 
83 Ibid, 99. 
84 Puthucherril, n 14, 178; art. 3(1) HKC. 
85 Puthucherril, n 14, 178. 
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Annex, supposed to provide technical details, stays vague in many areas, 86  for example 
regarding the obligations of ship-recycling facilities. They must operate in a way that will 
prevent, reduce, minimize and to the extent practicable eliminate adverse effects on 
the environment.87 
Those obligations are not specified. While the Convention provides that IMO guidelines have 
to be ‘taken into account’, the rules are not explicitly stated by the Convention.88 Another 
criticism is that the HKC promotes the ‘not in my backyard-syndrome’ where developed 
countries make developing countries bear the burden of their waste in form of end-of-life ships. 
The HKC for example does not entail an obligation for previous owners to pre-clean the vessel 
and the ship breaking State is supposed to bear the cost of pre-cleaning which shows the extent 
of environmental injustice.89 EU owners generate the waste before then shipping it to the 
developing world to get rid of it as cheap as possible, leaving the dirty work to developing 
countries. 
Issues with jurisdiction 
Another crucial issue of the Convention must be discussed. According to article 3 the HKC 
shall apply to 
.1 ships entitled to fly the flag of a Party or operating under its authority;  
.2 Ship Recycling Facilities operating under the jurisdiction of a Party. 
The Convention’s interpretation, implementation and enforcement are up to each State party 
and violations are subject to national laws .90 According to Article 4.1, it is the flag States that 
shall take measures to ensure compliance with the Convention’s requirements. Flag States are 
left with great leeway in the implementation and enforcement of the rules, especially 
considering the overall vagueness of the Convention and the unclarity regarding the application 
of guidelines. While ships are subject to surveys and certifications it is the flag State which is 
responsible for conducting them.91 According to Article 4.2 States are responsible for the Ship 
Recycling Facilities under their jurisdiction. 92  That means that the shipbreaking States 
                                               
86 Matz-Lück, n 64, 100. 
87 Regulation 17 Annex I to the HKC. 
88 Matz-Lück, n 64, 100. 
89 Mishra, S. ‘Non-entry into force of the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally 
Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009: An analysis from the perspective of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.’ (2018) 
Journal of International Maritime Safety, Environmental Affairs, and Shipping, 26. 
90 Galley, n 6, 173. 
91 Puthucherril, n 14, 153. 
92 Ibid; art. 6 HKC. 
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themselves are responsible for the creation and enforcement of rules to protect the environment 
from the ship breaking industry. Another issue is the authorisation of ship breaking facilities. 
While they have to be authorised according to regulation 8 of the Annex, article 6 HKC 
prescribes that it is the ship breaking State itself that authorises the facilities. The enactment of 
strict national environmental rules might limit the operations of ship breaking by ship breaking 
States. That those, who are highly dependent on the industry, enact such rules, seems unlikely.  
On the other hand, the HKC provides rights to act for port States: Article 9 gives port States the 
right to warn, detain, dismiss or exclude the ship from its ports. This might at least give ship 
owners the incentive to comply with the requirements regarding certificates if the non-
compliance can lead to issues while operating the vessel.93 The violation of the Convention and 
their sanction is, however, subject to national laws and enforcement.94 The Convention does 
not offer elements of control for other State parties and lacks a powerful compliance control 
mechanism.95 
A ‘Hong Kong ban’? 
It must be noted that the Convention does not contain a ban similar to the Basel or EU WSR 
ban which would prohibit the wrecking of ships in non-OECD/ non-EFTA countries. Instead 
the HKC works with a system of authorisation. However, a listing approach as taken in the EU 
SRR, which is discussed in detail below at 2.2, is more flexible: Instead of a complete export 
ban to certain areas vessels can be recycled in all facilities that are on a list regardless of where 
they are located. The goal is to ensure responsible ship recycling. For this ban is counter-
productive: A complete ban discourages the improvement of facilities in developing 
countries.96 Instead of hindering the utilisation of those existing facilities, their infrastructure 
and operation in less harmful ways should be enabled and promoted. This leads to the 
conclusion that a ban is not per se the most favourable option.  
However, the HKC, while not offering a ban, does also not offer a listing approach. This means 
that while the ban is less favourable than the listing approach, the HKC does not even offer 
that. Instead, there is a weak authorisation process where States approve facilities on their own 
territory. The goal of the HKC should be to implement a system with a listing approach. This 
will be discussed further down in the chapter on solutions. 
                                               
93 Matz-Lück, n 64, 101. 
94 Art. 10 HKC. 
95 Ibid. 
96  Andrews, A. ‘Beyond the Ban – can the Basel Convention adequately Safeguard the Interests of the World’s 
Poor in the International Trade of Hazardous Waste?’ (2009) Law Environment and Development Journal 5, 
180. 
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Non-entry into force 
The biggest issue is, however, that the Convention has not (yet) entered into force since the 
requirements of its article 17 have not been met. Article 17 HKC prescribes that 
[the] Convention shall enter into force 24 months after the date on which the 
following conditions are met:  
.1 not less than 15 States have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, or have deposited the requisite instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession in accordance with Article 16;  
.2 the combined merchant fleets of the States mentioned in paragraph 1.1 constitute 
not less than 40 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping; 
and  
.3 the combined maximum annual ship recycling volume of the States mentioned in 
paragraph 1.1 during the preceding 10 years constitutes not less than 3 per cent of 
the gross tonnage of the combined merchant shipping of the same States. 
There are three requirements. Firstly, 15 States must have signed the Convention. With India’s 
accession in the end of 2015 this requirement has been met.97 The second requirement has, 
however, not been met. While there are 15 contracting States they only constitute 30.21% of 
the gross tonnage of the world merchant fleet.98 There is also the third requirement, which is 
supposed to make sure that the parties have the capacity to meet their own ship recycling 
demands. This is made sure by requiring the combined maximum annual ship recycling volume 
to constitute at least 3% of their combined merchant fleet gross tonnage.99  
If the HKC enters into force it can constitute a step in the right direction, addressing the issue 
of shipbreaking in a comprehensive manner. At the present State however, the Convention does 
not add to the existing framework, as it is not in force.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the HKC offers valuable provisions, considers the whole life of the ship from 
cradle to grave, and holds both flag and recycling States responsible. The process is held to a 
higher standard than before: Especially valuable is that only certified ships can be wrecked and 
                                               
97 IMO, India accession brings ship recycling convention a step closer to entry into force (08.08.2020), available 
at http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/31-India-HKC.aspx. 
98 IMO (2020), Status of IMO Treaties (25.06.2020), available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202020%20May.pdf. 
99 Engels, n 69, 51. 
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only authorized yards can conduct the process. However, it seems problematic that the practice 
of beaching is not prohibited by the Convention. Furthermore, the rules themselves are vague 
and hard to enforce. States have great leeway in applying the rules and it is also the State parties 
themselves with strong interests in the shipbreaking industry which decide on the authorization 
of facilities.100 
2.2 EU regime – The Ship Recycling Regulation 
Besides the EU WSR, which is discussed above, the EU SRR was adopted by the EU Parliament 
and the Council of the EU in 2013 with the objective to reduce negative impacts of ship 
recycling.101 Firstly, the EU SRR promotes the HKC: 
This Regulation also aims to facilitate the ratification of the Hong Kong 
International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of 
Ships, 2009 (‘the Hong Kong Convention’).102 
States are required to ratify the HKC without delay and implements its measures while 
including more stringent provisions.103 Addressees of the regulation are, according to article 
2(1) EU SRR, the flag States. The key obligation is article 6(2)(a) EU SRR which prescribes 
that 
ship owners shall ensure that ships destined to be recycled [are] only recycled at 
ship recycling facilities that are included in the European List. 
It is important to note that the regulation sets higher standards than the HKC which does not 
operate under a listing approach but rather with a coastal State internal authorisation process. 
If the HKC was in force, article 1(2) HKC would clear up the relationship between the 
instruments enabling parties to implement stricter rules. 
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as preventing a Party from 
taking, individually or jointly, more stringent measures consistent with 
international law, with respect to the safe and environmentally sound recycling of 
ships, in order to prevent, reduce or minimize any adverse effects on human health 
and the environment. 
                                               
100 Regulation 16 Annex to the HKC. 
101 NGO Shipbreaking Platform, EU Ship Recycling Regulation (26.06.2020), available at 
https://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/issues-of-interest/the-law/eu-srr/. 
102 Art. 1 EU SRR. 
103 Galley, n 6, 192. 
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The EU SRR provides a listing approach and contains rules on the authorisation process. 
According to article 14 EU member States authorise the facilities in their own countries. For 
third States the process is different. Article 15(1) EU SRR prescribes that 
a ship recycling company owning a ship recycling facility located in a third country 
and intending to recycle ships flying the flag of a Member State shall submit an 
application to the Commission for inclusion of that ship recycling facility in the 
European List. 
To be included in the list facilities, located in the EU or not, must comply with the requirements 
set out in article 13 EU SRR. Besides the general obligation that they must be  
designed, constructed and operated in a safe and environmentally sound 
manner,104 
the provision factually prohibits the practice of beaching. According to article 13(1)(b) EU SRR 
recycling activities must be conducted from built structures, while environmentally sound 
management has to be ensured through 
the containment of all hazardous materials present on board during the entire ship 
recycling process so as to prevent any release of those materials into the 
environment; and in addition, the handling of hazardous materials, and of waste 
generated during the ship recycling process, only on impermeable floors with 
effective drainage systems.105 
Beaching, as the name suggests, happens on the beach, without any built structures and without 
impermeable floors or drainage systems and is therefore excluded.  
Additionally, there is article 23(1) EU SRR. It provides that 
natural or legal persons affected or likely to be affected by a breach of Article 13 
in conjunction with Article 15 and Article 16(1)(b) of this Regulation, or having a 
sufficient interest in environmental decision-making relating to the breach of 
Article 13 in conjunction with Article 15 and Article 16(1)(b) of this Regulation 
shall be entitled to request the Commission to take action under this Regulation 
with respect to such a breach or an imminent threat of such a breach. 
                                               
104 Art. 13(1)(b) EU SRR. 
105 Art. 13(1)(g)(i) EU SRR. 
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NGOs explicitly fall under the provision.106 The Commission must consider those requests and 
inform the persons who submitted the request of the decision to accede or refuse the request for 
actions, providing reasons for its decision.107 
Evaluation 
The stricter provisions and heightened standards are a great step for the protection of the 
environment. Especially important is the list approach of the regulation. There is, however, an 
argument which the shipping industry uses against the EU SRR: It claims that the facilities do 
not have the capacity to meet the recycling demand of EU flagged vessels108. This is however 
not true. Eight new yards were added to the list in 2018. Besides EU facilities it now includes 
four sites in Turkey and one in the US.109 Since the addition of the new yards the facilities on 
the EU list do have the capacity to recycle all EU flagged vessels.110 At this point, however, it 
must be kept in mind that the main generator of end-of-life ships are not EU flagged ships but 
the far greater number of EU owned vessels. The EU list facilities just meet the demand for EU 
flagged ships while not having the capacity to recycle all EU owned vessels. Those are not 
covered by the EU SRR. From the point of view of ship owners flying an EU flag means a more 
rigorous framework and higher costs for ships that are recycled in the EU instead of being 
wrecked in substandard breaking yards. This leads to the situation that the implementation of 
stricter rules might not result in a higher standard of ship breaking but instead encourage owners 
to make use of FOC and reflag their vessels to countries which are not bound by the EU SRR, 
thus leading to an overall even lower number of vessels being responsibly recycled.111 The main 
goal of the EU should be to achieve the environmentally friendly recycling of all ships with 
strong links to the EU, that means EU flagged vessels and vessels owned by EU nationals. The 
EU SRR fails to achieve that goal and focusses only on EU flagged vessels, deliberately leaving 
out a major part of the issue. 
                                               
106 Art. 23(1) EU SRR. 
107 Art. 23 (2), (3) EU SRR. 
108 Seatrade Maritime News, EU-flag owners could face shortage of compliant ship recycling yards 
(15.08.2020), available at https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/europe/eu-flag-owners-could-face-shortage-
compliant-ship-recycling-yards. 
109 Implementing decision (EU) No 2019/995 of the Commission of 17 June 2019. 
110 NGO Shipbreaking Platform and Transport & Environment, EU-listed yards can handle the recycling 
demand of EU-flagged ships (2018). 
111 European Commission, On the feasibility of a financial instrument that would facilitate safe and sound ship 
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While the rules are a great step in the direction of less environmentally harming shipbreaking 
practices, they miss the main generators of waste. Additionally, the rules itself are not strict 
enough. There is no clear provision on prior informed consent and no obligation for the 
exporting States to pre-clean the vessels.112 Additionally, flag State jurisdiction gives flag 
States great leeway.113 
2.3 Applicability of and relationship between the instruments 
As discussed above, the Basel Convention, transposed in European law through the EU WSR, 
is applicable to end-of-life ships. They contain the Basel ban or respectively for countries bound 
by the EU WSR the EFTA ban, prohibiting member States from exporting their hazardous 
waste to the developing world. On the other hand, there are the HKC and the EU SSR which 
do not prohibit export of end-of-life ships to the developing world per se. Instead, they provide 
rules on the authorisation of facilities and the EU SRR established the European list of approved 
facilities where ship recycling is allowed. Under the HKC facilities can lie in the developing 
world if they were authorised by their State. At this point it is important to mention article 27 
EU SRR. According to the provision the EU WSR is not applicable for ships falling under the 
scope of the SSR. This means that for ships flagged by EU member States the EU WSR ban is 
not applicable. Instead they have to comply with the EU SRR. In this part the applicability of 
the different instruments will be assessed on the basis of four scenarios. In all scenarios an 
owner who is a national of an EU member State sells the vessel to a cash buyer with the intent 
to scrap it at a shipbreaking yard that is not licensed by the EU and which does not conform to 
environmental minimum standards. It is assumed that, when talking about the Basel 
Convention, the respective States are not only party to the Basel Convention but especially to 
the Ban Amendment. At this point it is important to keep in mind that the Basel Convention 
lays obligations on port States while the EU SRR implements obligations on flag States. 
Non-EU flag + OECD port State 
In the first scenario the vessel is flagged with a non-EU flag and is supposed to start its journey 
to the breaking yard from an OECD port State. The EU SRR is not applicable to non-EU flag 
States which is why the European list approach does not apply in the present case. However, 
the Basel Convention and its ban apply to the OECD member State. If the State is an EU 
member State, the EU WSR is applicable. This means that, according to article 4A of the Basel 
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Convention or in the case of an EU port State article 34 EU WSR, the State of export shall 
prohibit the transboundary movement of the ship. It is important to mention that this is the case 
where the application of the Basel Convention and the EU WSR on ship breaking as discussed 
in chapter 2.1.3 is crucial. If end-of-life ships did not fall under the definition of waste, no 
international laws would apply to the breaking process. 
EU flag + non-OECD port State 
In the second scenario the vessel is flagged with an EU member State flag, for example France, 
and lies in a non-OECD port. In that case the EU SRR is applicable to the flag State which has 
to ensure that the owners recycle the vessel only in approved facilities included in the European 
list. The Basel ban on the other hand is not applicable to the non-OECD port State since it only 
binds OECD members.  
EU flag + OECD port State 
In the third scenario the vessel flies an EU flag while it is supposed to start its journey to the 
breaking yard from an OECD port State. The European list approach is applicable to flag States 
which are obligated to ensure that owners only break ships in approved facilities. Additionally, 
OECD port States would usually be obligated to prohibit the transboundary movement of 
hazardous waste to non-OECD countries under the Basel ban, or if it is an EU member State to 
EFTA countries under the EU WSR ban. There are two possibilities within the scenario: (1) the 
OECD port State is also an EU member State or (2) the OECD port State is not an EU member 
State.  
In the first option, the vessel is flagged by an EU member State and the port State falls under 
the scope of the EU WSR. At this point the relationship between the EU SRR and the EU WSR 
is important. The EU SRR is an instrument specifically developed to solve issues around 
shipbreaking. The participating States agreed that shipbreaking has to be regulated in such a 
ship breaking specific instrument (the EU SRR) and that the most suitable method is the list 
approach rather than a complete ban. It would be counterproductive if a port State which is 
party to the EU SRR had to stop the export of a ship to a breaking yard in a non-EFTA country 
even though the facility is operated in a way approved by the EU SRR authorisation process. 
States took that into account when developing the EU SRR and created articles 27 EU SRR and 
1(3)(i) EU WSR which exclude EU flagged vessels from the scope of the EU WSR.114 
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The following shall be excluded from the scope of this Regulation: 
[…] ships flying the flag of a Member State falling under the scope of Regulation 
(EU) No 1257/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
In the situation of a vessel flying an EU member State flag and starting its journey from an EU 
member port State the EFTA ban is therefore not applicable. The EU SRR listing approach 
applies. 
In the second option the flag State is an EU member State. The port State is not a member of 
the EU, while being a member of the OECD. This creates the situation that the EU flag State 
must make sure the vessel is only recycled at an approved facility, even if this facility lies in a 
non-OECD State, while the port State has the obligation to prohibit the export to such a facility. 
The question is if a port State can (and must) prohibit the export even though the flag State is 
allowed to export the ship to an authorised non-OECD yard according to the EU SRR, and 
therefore rules on environmental protection are in place. Prohibiting the export even though a 
responsible recycling process is guaranteed according to the EU listing approach seems 
counterproductive. This however does not lift the port State’s obligation to stop the export. The 
Basel ban is applicable law. At the same time, it is important to note how there have been 
extensive debates around the HKC which has not fulfilled the requirements to enter into force 
because of lack of ratification. Even if it was in place, the HKC would not entail the listing 
approach as laid out in the EU SRR. As discussed above, the HKC offers an authorisation 
process for facilities in which the State where the facility is located is responsible for the 
authorisation. The international community has not been able to agree on a listing approach. It 
cannot be assumed that States which did not even ratify the HKC, which on top of that is weaker 
than the EU SRR, are indirectly bound by the EU regulation. For these reasons the Basel ban 
applies, and the port State can, and must, stop the export of vessels headed for shipbreaking. 
This shows another flaw of the framework. A list approach is favourable because it is more 
flexible and makes use of all recycling capacities regardless of where the facility lies. In the 
present case, the port State would however be forced to stop a vessel from its journey to a 
recycling yard even if the yard is approved by the EU and complies with environmental 
standards. The right the EU legislation gives to EU coastal States is meaningless when it can 
be overridden by the port State which highlights the regulation’s limited applicability. 
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Non-EU flag + non-OECD port State 
Finally, there is the fourth scenario, in which the vessel flies a non-EU flag, for example 
Panama, and is supposed to start its journey to the breaking yard in the port of a non-OECD 
country. Neither the Basel ban nor the European list approach of the EU SRR are applicable. 
This shows the magnitude of the framework’s loopholes. As further explained in chapter 3 the 
practice of reflagging ships or flying a non-EU flag from the beginning is a common practice. 
This means that a substantial number of vessels owned by EU member State owners evade 
regulations and operate without any real framework on environmental protection regarding ship 
breaking. It is important to note that this is also the case when there is no port State when the 
parties decided to sell the ship while it was in an area not under any State’s jurisdiction.115 
Evaluation 
The chart below shows which instruments are applicable in which scenario. 
  
                                               
115 See the evaluation in 2.1.3. 
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It is important to note that in the fourth scenario none of the instruments is applicable and 
owners national to EU member States operating their vessels under a non-EU flag, starting the 
vessels journey in a non-OECD port can easily make use of the loophole. It must also be 
highlighted that, while the EU SRR is applicable to EU member States, not in all cases of 
vessels flying the flag of an EU member State the regulation actually applies. In scenario 3b 
the Basel ban obliges the port State to stop the transfer, even if the vessel is headed to an EU 
approved facility. At this point it can also be seen how important the application of the Basel 
or WSR ban is. If end-of-life ships did not fall under the Convention loopholes would exist in 
the cases of 1) and 3) b) of the chart as well.  
2.4 Conclusion 
There are multiple legally binding and non-binding instruments on international and EU level 
dealing with shipbreaking. However, few of the instruments seem to offer sufficient 
environmental protection. The London Convention and Protocol are not applicable, while the 
LOSC is too general to regulate the matters. The applicability of the Basel Convention and its 
EU implementation through the EU WSR is highly debated. While in the end, as discussed 
above, they are applicable to end-of-life ships their provisions are easily circumvented. More 
promising is the HKC offering more stringent regulations for the protection of the environment, 
especially designed for the matters of ship recycling. The HKC is, however, not yet in force. 
Additionally, there is the EU SRR applicable to EU member State vessels in most cases. Its 
provisions seem to offer a good framework for ship disposal. The EU SRR, however, only 
addresses EU flagged vessels, and leaves out the real generators of waste, the EU owners.  
In conclusion, States have realised that harmful shipbreaking practices cannot continue and 
started taking steps towards a greener ship recycling process. However, as shown on the basis 
of the different scenarios, there are substantial loopholes in the framework and the legislation 
is far from a comprehensive regime.  
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3 Evasion of rules 
So far, this work has debated the regulatory framework on shipbreaking and whether the rules 
themselves offer a comprehensive regime. There is another issue that touches upon the matters 
of ship breaking which is the evasion of existing rules. 
3.1 Circumvention of the Basel Convention and EU WSR 
As discussed above, the Basel Convention and EU WSR focus on port State jurisdiction. A port 
State has to prevent the transboundary movement of an end-of-life ship to non-OECD or non-
EFTA countries if it is considered waste. The important factor which makes an otherwise 
operative vessel waste is the ‘intent to dispose’. As established above the sale to a broker does 
constitute this criterion and obliges the port State to stop the vessel from leaving the port. This 
is however easily circumvented. The only thing the owner has to do is to conclude the sale when 
the ship is in an area outside of the port States’ jurisdiction. The port State does not have any 
access possibility here and the instruments do not apply. 
3.2 FOC 
There is another important issue touching upon shipbreaking which is the use of FOC and 
reflagging ships to evade otherwise applicable rules. According to article 92 (1) LOSC every 
ship  
shall sail under the flag of one State only and […] shall be subject to its jurisdiction 
on the high seas. 
 Article 94 LOSC prescribes that 
Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. 
Historically, ships would be registered according to their owners’ nationality. This has however 
shifted with ship registries opening for the registration of vessels from other nationalities, 
starting with Panama in 1917.116 From then on, more and more owners started to register their 
ships in a different country. This has led to the current situation that more than 70% of the 
global fleet is registered in so-called open registries.117 In the beginning of the practice the 
                                               
116 Piniella, F; Alcaide; J, Rodríguez-Díaz, E ‘The Panama Ship Registry: 1917–2017’ (2017) Marine Policy 77, 
14. 
117 As of 2015; Ibid, 13. 
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reasons for using open registries were of political or military nature such as the maintenance of 
neutrality during war whereas today flagging out is mostly influenced by economic 
incentives.118 
At this point the terms «open registry» and «FOC» must be assessed. While both expressions 
are commonly used there is no legally accepted definition for either of them, and they have 
been ‘defined by usage’.119 Two factors commonly surface in attempts to define the terms: The 
relationship between the flag State and the registered vessel and the flag State’s reputation 
regarding compliance with international standards.120 The term FOC describes the practice of 
registering a ship in country that does not match the State of vessel owner control or 
residence. 121  In 1974, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) launched a 
campaign against FOC and defined FOC as a flag  
where beneficial ownership and control of a vessel is found to be elsewhere than in 
the country of the flag the vessel is flying.122  
The ITF’s fair practices committee maintains a list on which there are currently 35 flags which 
it declares FOC.123 Open registries equate to FOC,124 meaning registries offering registration to 
ships by foreign owners, often with minimal restrictions.125 They tend to have few requirements 
for owner and vessel regarding financial and regulatory controls while the registration is as easy 
as possible. In many cases the registration process is automated and neither the owner nor the 
ship even must be present in the country of registration. In the Panamanian register for example 
the registration process takes less than four hours.126  
Are FOC always weak? 
Some scholars argue that on top of the divergence of owner’s nationality and flag State 
definition of a FOC includes that the State is non-compliant regarding the promotion of certain 
                                               
118 Miller, DD; Sumaila, UR (2014). ‘Flag use behavior and IUU activity within the international fishing fleet: 
Refining definitions and identifying areas of concern’ (2014) Marine Policy 44, 204. 
119 Ibid, 205.  
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid, 204. 
122 IFT Global, Flags of Convenience (01.07.2020), available 
at  https://www.itfglobal.org/en/sector/seafarers/flags-of-convenience. 
123 Ibid. 
124 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Churchill, RR, The meaning of the ‘genuine link’ requirement 
in relation to the nationality of ships (2000), 13. 
125 Alderton, T; Winchester, N. ’Globalisation and de-regulation in the maritime industry.’ (2002) Marine 
Policy 26, 36. 
126 Piniella, Alcaide, Rodríguez-Díaz, n 117, 15. 
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standards such as social and environmental issues.127 This, however, cannot be the case. Non-
compliance is a separate issue. While vessel owners might be inclined to use flags of States that 
are known for not enforcing international rules, there are flags of convenience that do comply 
with their duties and whose framework or enforcement cannot be described as weak in general. 
For example, it turned out that in some cases pay and conditions on vessels where owner 
nationality and flag correspond can be worse than on ships where the owner’s and the register’s 
nationality differ.128 Thus, while those ‘flags of non-compliance’ and flags with weak laws 
certainly pose issues and often overlap with FOC, non-compliance or a weak legal framework 
cannot be an indispensable component of the definition of FOC. Therefore, a FOC must be 
defined as the mere divergence of nationality of ownership and flagging, for whatever 
advantage the owner seeks. While FOC often are weak they do not have to be. At this point it 
is important to note that the issue with ship breaking is not really non-compliance of certain 
flag States with environmental rules. The issue is rather that States register with flags that are 
not bound by certain rules such as the EU SRR. 
The requirements the ship and owner must fulfil when registering a vessel are subject to national 
jurisdiction:  
Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the 
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.129 
 The only condition imposed by the regime is found in article 91 (1) LOSC and art. 5 (1) of the 
1958 High Seas Convention (HSC)130:  
There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. 
What is the «genuine link»? 
There has been extensive debate about the term ‘genuine link’ and no consensus among either 
States or scholars has been reached.131 There is no definition of the term in either the LOSC or 
the High Seas Convention and there is no established meaning in international law since there 
is no earlier history of the use of the term.132 Two central questions are raised: 
(1) Is the genuine link between ship and flag State a mandatory requirement to receive the flag 
of a country?  
                                               
127 Miller; Sumaila, n 118, 204f. 
128 Alderton; Winchester, n 125, 36. (2002). 
129 Art. 91 (1) LOSC. 
130 Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958 (450 UNTS 11). 
131 ITF, Churchill, n 124, 4. 
132 Ibid, 12. 
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And (2) what are the consequences if no such link exists. Can other States reject the flag? 
Historical developments 
A quick look at the development of the provisions might help. The International Law 
Commission (ILC) started dealing with the issue as early as 1950.133 Controversial debates led 
to the creation of draft article 5 which read: 
Each State may fix the conditions for the registration of ships in its territory and 
the right to fly its flag. Nevertheless, for purposes of recognition of its national 
character by other States, a ship must either:  
1. Be the property of the State concerned; or  
2. Be more than half owned by: 
(a) Nationals of or persons legally domiciled in the territory of the State concerned 
and actually resident there; or […]. 
After further discussions in the following years, the article became article 29 which reads: 
each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the 
registration of ships in its territory and for the right to fly its flag. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of recognition of the national character of the ship by 
other States, there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.  
In the end article 29 became article 5 on the High Seas Convention with a vote of 65 - 0134. It 
provides that 
each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the 
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. […] There must 
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and 
social matters over ships flying its flag. 
States dropped the element of non-recognition in the process and added the element of effective 
exercise of jurisdiction and control. This means that other States are not entitled to question the 
nationality of ships. 
                                               
133 Ibid, 16. 
134 Cogliati-Bantz, VP ‘Disentangling the ‘Genuine link’: Enquiries in Sea, Air and Space Law’ (2010) Nordic 
Journal of International Law 79, 397. 
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Cases 
There is a small number of cases discussing the nationality of ships. The first is the IMCO 
case135 in which the ICJ was asked for an advisory opinion on the constitution of the Marine 
Safety Committee. The term ‘largest ship owning nations’ became important. The Court stated 
that ‘ship owning’ could be decided regardless of beneficial ownership.136 The Court did not 
discuss the element of the genuine link. Another important case in the issue is the 1999 M/V 
Saiga Case (No 2).137 The M/V Saiga was a St. Vincent flagged vessel arrested by Guinea for 
alleged violations of customs laws. It was Cypriot owned, managed by a Swiss company, and 
sailing with a Ukrainian crew. St. Vincent challenged the arrest while Guinea argued that the 
ship was not registered validly in St. Vincent and, if it was, there was no genuine link.138 The 
Court decided that the registration under St. Vincent laws was valid since the registry of ships 
is under the States’ exclusive jurisdiction. Further, in the opinion of the Court there was nothing 
in article 94 LOSC permitting the non-recognition of a flag by other States. According to the 
Court the purpose of the genuine link is the more effective implementation of flag State duties 
and does not establish criteria for the validity of the registration to be challenged by other 
States.139 This view was upheld by ITLOS in its 2014 judgement on the Virginia G.140 Guinea-
Bissau had arrested a Panama-flagged vessel in Guinea-Bissau's EEZ. Guinea-Bissau argued 
the inadmissibility of Panama’s claims because of the lack of a genuine link between the flag 
and the ship and that it therefore did not have to acknowledge the ship’s right of navigation in 
its EEZ.141 The Tribunal further stated that 
once a ship is registered, the flag State is required, under article 94 of the 
Convention, to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over that ship in order to 
ensure that it operates in accordance with generally accepted international 
regulations, procedures and practices. This is the meaning of ‘genuine link’.142 
                                               
135 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Cornmittee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, (Advisory Opinion) [1960] ICJ. Rep 150. 
136 ITF, Churchill, n 124, 23. 
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141 Ibid, 44. 
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Conclusion 
Above discussion shows the turbulent history of the requirement of the genuine link and how 
many aspects seem unclear. However, some main points can be deducted: Firstly, there is the 
general agreement that a genuine link in some form is required. It is common agreement that it 
is the States’ discretion how genuineness is ensured.143 One form is national laws on nationality 
of ownership or crew. It is, however, not the only possibility, as seen by the fact that such 
requirement could not reach a majority in the process of developing art. 5 HSC.144 In the end, 
the above discussions and especially consistent case law show that the meaning of the genuine 
link is the duty for flag States to exercise effective jurisdiction and control on vessels registered 
under their flag. 
FOC in shipbreaking 
The regulatory framework of ship registry causes issues related to ship breaking. Flag States 
have discretion in registering ships and thus are given substantive leeway. As established above 
the genuine link requirement poses the obligation for States to exercise effective jurisdiction 
and control on their vessels, which makes the genuine link a result of and not a precondition to 
register under a certain flag. This leads to the situation that ship owners can easily register in 
countries which are not bound by the Basel Convention, EU WSR or EU SRR. If ship owners 
register their vessels in countries that are not party to those Conventions the provisions do not 
apply to them. The genuine link ‘only’ means that the flag State must enforce laws applicable 
to them – if the main legal framework on ship breaking is not applicable, the rules run dry as 
owners can easily evade them by reflagging. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The subject of ship breaking is not a legal void and certain rules and standards do exist. This 
chapter showed how easy it is for vessel owners to circumvent these existing rules, by either 
disguising their intent to dispose of the vessel or by using FOC. This shows how it is not only 
important to implement strict rules on the subject of ship recycling, but especially to pay 
attention to the realities of the industry: Imposing stricter and stricter rules on flag and port 
States, which owners can evade easily by leaving the port States jurisdiction and reflagging, 
cannot be the way. Solutions must be found to prevent these practices to not only have a strict 
framework on paper but one that reaches the actual generators of waste – the ship owners. 
                                               
143 ITF, Churchill, n 124, 38. 
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4 Possible Solutions to close the gaps 
In the previous chapters the gaps in the framework on ship breaking were identified. The 
following section will assess how the identified gaps can be addressed. Firstly, it will be 
assessed how the different applicable instruments should be developed to be able to tackle the 
difficulties. In the second part possible changes regarding the framework of FOC will be 
discussed. 
4.1 Changing the rules on ship breaking 
4.1.1 The Basel Convention 
The Basel Convention has three main issues. First, there is an ongoing discussion as to whether 
the Convention is applicable to end-of-life ships. The legal issue is if the sale of a ship to a cash 
buyer constitutes the intent to dispose the vessel and therefore if it falls under the definition of 
waste. The conclusion in this paper is that selling the ship to a broker does in fact constitute the 
intent to dispose of the vessel. A seemingly small change should be taken to solve the issue: 
The Convention should be rendered in the regard that the sale of end-of-life ships to a broker 
explicitly falls under the definition of waste, which could be possible by a decision by the 
Conference of Parties. It must be kept in mind that if the Basel Convention was not applicable, 
in the case of a non-EU flag and a non-EU port no international legislation would be applicable 
to the issues of shipbreaking (see scenarios above). The clear applicability of the Basel 
Convention on end-of-life ships is an important step to reach a higher level of legal certainty 
and close that loophole. However, the debate is still in full force and both the ship breaking 
industry and ship owners pose a strong lobby against that interpretation. Therefore, while 
desirable, it is unlikely that States will reach such agreement. 
A second point of criticism regards the port State jurisdiction approach pursued by the 
Convention. It leads to the fact that the circumvention of rules is easy: If the sale is conducted 
when the ship is outside of a State’s maritime zones the Convention is not applicable. A possible 
and desirable solution is the establishment of flag State jurisdiction which is applicable 
independently of a ship’s location. That would mean that the flag State would have to stop the 
vessel’s departure to a breaking yard regardless of where the vessel is when the sale takes place. 
It is however questionable if States would agree to a change to flag State jurisdiction. States 
have tried to implement an instrument relying (also) on flag State jurisdiction – the HKC. The 
HKC has not entered into force because the requirements of art. 17 HKC have not yet been 
fulfilled. At this point, the top flag States’ participation must be evaluated – only two of the top 
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ten flag States, Panama and Malta, acceded to the Convention.145 Keeping in mind that the top 
five flag States account for almost 50% and the top ten for 65% of the world’s total ocean-going 
merchant fleet146 it becomes understandable that without their participation the entry into force 
of the HKC is almost impossible. The reason for the flag States’ hesitance is simple: The HKC 
imposes obligations on them regarding the ship breaking process without offering any 
substantial incentives. If one keeps in mind that flag States were not willing to implement an 
instrument relying on flag State jurisdiction specific to ship recycling it becomes clear why the 
implementation of such jurisdiction for all transboundary movements of waste is unlikely.  
The third criticism of the Basel Convention and the EU WSR is their system of a ban instead 
of a listing approach for recycling facilities. As discussed above, the listing approach is 
favourable in the case of ship breaking. It is however in question how likely the incorporation 
of a listing approach is. States have developed the HKC at a global level. To this date it has not 
entered into force because of a lack of formal adherence in order to fulfil the requirements of  
article 17 HKC. One must keep in mind that this is the case even though the Convention does 
not include a ban or a listing approach – even though its rules are weaker than including a listing 
approach the implementation has not been possible. This implies strongly that the incorporation 
of a listing approach on a global level in the Basel Convention is unlikely. Such approach in 
the Basel Convention would not only cover ship breaking facilities but rather extend to all other 
forms of waste. If the adoption of a list for only ship breaking in the HKC has been impossible, 
the global community will not be able to agree on such approach for the recycling of all wastes.  
4.1.2 The HKC 
4.1.2.1 Stricter rules 
As discussed above the HKC, which is not in force, offers ground rules on the operation of 
ships and breaking facilities. Firstly, its rules itself are discussed. Facilities must be authorised 
by the State they are operated in. However, it seems problematic that the State profiting from 
the industry is also the actor authorising the facilities and often just barely fulfils the minimum 
standards. A solution to ensure more environmentally friendly practices regarding ship breaking 
is the creation of an independent assessment body, evaluating and authorising facilities. It is, 
however, questionable whether States would agree on this. Even with the weaker provisions – 
namely authorisation by the breaking States itself instead of a listing approach such as in the 
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EU SRR - States have not been able to reach the implementation of the agreement due to the 
inability to fulfil the requirements of article 17 HKC. In case of an independent institution 
authorising facilities ship breaking States would give up great leeway. Their sovereignty would 
be touched upon if an international institution could influence the operation of their industry. 
A provision in that regard does not seem likely at this point. Another important element to reach 
the goal of a less environmentally harmful ship breaking industry is to ban the beaching 
practice. Provisions comparable to the EU SRR are desirable. Additionally, the prior informed 
consent principle as in the Basel Convention should be implemented and the duty to pre-clean 
the vessel before it reaches the developing countries. 
Further, as discussed above, the HKC offers neither a ban nor a listing approach. A listing 
approach as in the EU SRR is desirable. All proposed changes for the HKC however are 
confronted with the same issue: The Convention has not even managed to acquire enough 
parties for its implementation in its current, weaker form. The implementation with an even 
stricter listing approach seems unlikely. 
4.1.2.2 Ensuring entry into force 
Therefore, perhaps the most obvious solution at this point instead of thinking about stricter rules 
is to first at least reach the implementation of the HKC in its current form, offering ground rules 
on the safe and environmentally sound recycling of ships. Even if the rules are not as strict as 
would be desirable the HKC is the first international instrument specifically designed for ship 
breaking and could constitute an important legal basis. As said above it has not entered into 
force because the requirements of article 17 HKC have not been met. It must be discussed why 
the Convention has not managed to meet the required 40% of the gross tonnage of the world’s 
merchant fleet and how the entry into force could be ensured. It is important to note how the 
major ship breaking countries have been hesitant to accede to the Convention – India and 
Turkey are the only two of the five major ship breaking countries that are parties to the 
Convention. Both only became parties relatively recently in 2019.147 One reason for this is how 
the HKC imposes a wide array of duties for the countries operating ship breaking facilities in 
regulations 9 and 15 to 23 while failing to offer advantages or incentives to develop their ship 
recycling industry in a less environmentally harmful way. An example for that is how the flag 
State is not responsible for pre-cleaning, leaving the responsibility for bearing the costs to the 
ship breaking States who did not generate the waste or ever operated the respective ships.148 
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The entry into force of the HKC is desirable to reach understandable and comprehensive ground 
rules specifically for ship breaking. The Convention does however not give top flag States and 
ship breaking States convincing arguments to sign the agreement when laying multiple 
obligations on them from the operation of ships to the operation of ship breaking facilities 
without offering many advantages. Ways must be found to give them a reason to accede. The 
HKC at their current state does not convince the necessary parties. A solution might be the 
strengthening of EU rules, as discussed in the next chapter below. 
4.1.3 The EU SRR leading to the implementation of the HKC? 
A solution to the weak acceptance of the HKC might be the strengthening of EU rules leading 
to flag and ship breaking States wanting to participate in an international agreement. As seen 
above the approach to develop an international instrument is difficult. The actors are diverse 
and have very different interests. On the quest to find rules everyone agrees with the respective 
rules become more and more diluted until the framework that an international instrument such 
as the HKC can offer consists of only very basic ground rules. The HKC does for example not 
offer an effective authorisation process and beaching is still allowed. Another approach instead 
of a weak international instrument is the use of a regional agreement such as the EU SRR. 
European owned ships constitute a big share of the vessels that are broken in Asian ship 
breaking yards. Effectively hindering those to be broken in sub-standard breaking yards would 
constitute a strong incentive for breaking countries to adhere to environmental standards – if 
Europeans are forbidden to sell their vessels to the major ship breaking countries the ship 
breaking industry will be forced to change their practices to conform with the European list 
requirements. This would lead to a change in the ship breaking industry towards a greener future 
– and even constitute an incentive for ship breaking countries to become parties to an 
international agreement like the HKC. 
Rules addressing owners 
For this to happen the EU SRR must lead to the fact that in practice fewer European owned 
ships reach Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, constituting a real threat to the industry how it is. 
The issue that shows itself here is that while the EU SRR’s rules are strict and include a listing 
approach, at the moment they only apply to EU member States in their capacity as flag States 
while very few vessels owned by European owners are actually flagged in EU member States. 
The provisions do not address the far greater number of non-European flagged but European 
owned vessels which are able to, and do, sail to the substandard breaking yards unhindered. 
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While the EU SRR offers laudable provisions, for this reason its reach is limited. The EU SRR 
must be amended in the way that the owner State of the vessel is an addressee besides the flag 
State. European owner States shall have the obligation to prevent their nationals from exporting 
their vessels to facilities that are not included on the list. This is the only way the stream of 
vessels from Europe to breaking yards in Asia can be reduced and incite ship breaking countries 
to agree to rules offering stricter environmental protection. This means that besides the rules 
applying on flag States, EU member States shall have the duty to prohibit their ship owning 
nationals from wrecking their vessels in ship breaking yards which are not included in the 
European list. Only this way all ships which have a strong link to the EU – be it because of the 
flag or owner nationality – can be covered. 
Intent to dispose 
However, there is an issue with this approach. It could incite circumvention practices known 
from the Basel Convention: Owners would simply sell the vessel to a non-European broker and 
evade the rules. This shows one of the biggest flaws of the current system of ship breaking: The 
original ship owner who is the actual generator of the waste escapes all responsibilities by 
selling the ship to a cash buyer. Puthucherril formulates that the ship owners need to have more 
control over the vessels,149 making it sound as if ship owners were somehow robbed of their 
rights on determining where the ship shall go. He is right in one way – ship owners should have 
more control over the vessels. However, there is more to it. Ship owners must face more 
responsibilities over the vessels they try to get rid of. In reality those owners do not want control 
over the end-of-life vessels – as soon as they are not profitable anymore they want to sell the 
ships and escape the responsibilities of recycling them in an environmentally friendly way. This 
out of sight-out of mind mentality must be thwarted.  
The assessments of the Basel Convention regarding the intent to dispose must therefore be 
transposed to the EU SRR. This leads to two substantial changes the EU SRR needs to undergo: 
(1) European owner States shall prevent their nationals from breaking their ships in 
breaking yards which are not included in the European list. 
And (2) the decisive moment in time for the criteria of ownership shall be the initial 
owner’s intent to dispose of the vessel. This includes, as the Basel Convention shall 
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be interpreted, the sale to a broker. An owner could therefore not sell a vessel to a 
broker when that ship will be sold further to a yard not included in the EU list. 
Incentive to accede to the HKC 
This solution, the added focus on owners instead of flag States in the EU SRR, has two expected 
effects. Firstly, the rules of the EU SRR based on owners’ nationalities would cover a greater 
number of vessels and be harder to circumvent: Just registering the vessel in an open register 
would not suffice. Secondly, hindering EU owners from sailing their vessels to Asia would 
make the implementation of the HKC more likely: The major ship breaking States would 
receive much less business. That would constitute a strong incentive for the ship breaking States 
to agree to an instrument implementing stricter rules – such instrument could be the HKC. Ship 
breaking countries would first be incited to fulfil the standards of a European list to be able to 
receive business from EU owned vessels. In the future this would lead to the desire to become 
part of an international agreement such as the HKC, where the ship breaking States would not 
only have to comply with rules of a regional agreement in which they have no say but where 
they could rather influence the agreement. The end solution should be that ship breaking States, 
which at this point will have started to develop recycling facilities living up to the requirements 
of the European list, accede to the HKC, thus making it enter into force. Further, ship breaking 
States will want to be able to influence process of authorization instead of just living up to the 
EU list’s requirements without having a place at the table. Therefore, the agreement on the 
adoption of a list approach in the HKC, executed by an independent international authority, 
seems possible in the future.  
This solution also takes flag State interests into account. Instead of putting more and more 
obligations on them which can be easily circumvented anyways, the rules focus on owners – 
who are the real generators of the waste – and gives incentives to sub-standard facilities to 
implement less environmentally harming practices. 
Future changes of the HKC 
The changes in the EU SRR are expected to lead to the HKC’s gradual acceptance and may 
lead to its entry into force. In the next step, the HKC should be strengthened by implementing 
stricter rules such as a ban of the beaching practice and the implementation of a prior informed 
consent principle. Rules on pre-cleaning the vessels should be added 150  and rules on the 
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‘breaker-friendly’ construction and operation of vessels should be followed.151 At this point, 
the structure of the HKC which consists of the main text and an Annex is beneficial: The Annex 
is more flexible as it is easier to change, and it can be adjusted by and by as the approval of the 
Convention grows to facilitate a more regulated and greener future of ship breaking. In the long 
run, the HKC should offer the same framework as proposed for the EU SRR. A listing approach 
should be implemented in the international instrument and owners should be addressed. As 
argued above, such changes are unlikely at the moment since the HKC has not been able to 
enter into force yet, even with the weaker provisions. However, after the strengthening of the 
EU SRR leading to the entry into force of the HKC, those changes should be the long-term 
goals of the Convention. 
4.1.4 Other mechanisms 
In the previous part the unwillingness of States, especially ship breaking States, to implement 
the HKC because of the legal obligations it put on them was discussed. This, however, is not 
the only reason keeping States from acceding to the Convention. The reason why ship breaking 
is conducted in environmentally harmful ways on the beach instead of using more sustainable 
and preferable methods like the dry-dock procedure 152  is simple: Beaching is cheaper. 
Modifying and rebuilding the whole industry to meet stricter requirements of a new instrument 
is expensive and perhaps even unaffordable for the developing States.153 At the same time, by 
far the greatest part of ships destined for disposal is generated by developed countries, a great 
part of it by EU owners.154 They produce most of the waste while not having the recycling 
capacity for all EU owned vessels in their own countries. Creating recycling facilities meeting 
the EU SRR requirements would be expensive – thus they export their end-of-life ships to 
developing countries. Those two factors, developed countries producing waste and them not 
having enough capacities, cannot cumulate in the situation that developing countries are forced 
to renew their facilities at their own charge to meet the developed countries ship recycling 
demand. Developed countries must recognise their responsibilities and finance parts of the 
building or renewal processes. Developed States should meet the standards of the polluter pays 
principle as one of the fundamental principles of international environmental law, 155 
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incorporated in EU law through article 191.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU),156 as formulated in the Rio Declaration:157  
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due 
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment. 
To put it in plain language: EU member States should pay for the development of ship breaking 
facilities in Asia which they so actively use because it is cheaper, and they do not have the 
facilities themselves. Something that could be imagined would be an arrangement of 
participation shares based on percentage of vessels owned by respective nationals, for example 
under the auspices of the IMO or under EU law such as the EU SRR. The EU as the real 
generator of wastes should (co-)finance the transition of Asian ship breaking facilities to include 
dry docks. Additionally, there should be rules in the HKC or other instruments prescribing 
technology transfer and adequate training of personnel. At the same time, EU member States 
should build facilities in the EU itself that meet the EU SRR’s requirements and add facilities 
inside and outside of the EU to the list.  
A strong lobby against the HKC and similar instruments is conducted by ship owners. Their 
concern is the rise of costs created by the HKC’s provisions, for example when inventories on 
hazardous materials must be created and maintained, ultimately leading to disadvantages in 
competition with owners from non-EU countries.158 It does not seem like mere requirements to 
keep an inventory will create strong disadvantages or that international competition should be 
a reason to put the development of a greener future for ship recycling on hold. However, when 
ship owners sell their old vessels to Asian ship breaking yards (or cash buyers who subsequently 
sell to the breaking yard) they receive the market price for scrap steel in return. If they sold the 
ships to breaking yards in the EU this would not be the case – instead of profiting from the 
scrap they might even have to pay for the disposal of toxic waste.159 Financial incentives for 
them to encourage owners to choose more responsible ship recycling practices could be kept in 
mind as a mechanism to forward the acceptance and application of the instrument, for example 
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in the form of tax reliefs. Another form of incentive for owners could be the Ship Recycling 
License (SRL), which is discussed further below. 
Another approach is the regulation of ship breaking on a national level, meaning that the ship 
breaking States should create a stricter framework. It is however questionable if States would 
do this. The breaking States benefit directly from the industry, by renting out breaking plots 
and through taxes and customs. 160  When India strengthened the national framework on 
shipbreaking the industry migrated to Bangladesh instead. 161  This does not help the 
environment, it just leads to a race to the bottom between the ship breaking countries to be the 
most desirable - the cheapest – location.162 Ship breaking is a global issue which cannot only 
be tackled on only the national level. Additionally, the EU as a big actor in generating the waste 
should not escape responsibilities by waiting for developing countries, which are dependent of 
the ship breaking industry, to create a national framework. 
4.1.4.1 Conclusion 
In the past decades States have realised the necessity of the development of rules on the 
breaking of ships and the protection of the environment. The above explanations show, 
however, that the goal of a less environmentally harmful ship breaking industry cannot be 
achieved through one of the discussed instruments at this point in time. Too many actors with 
diverging interests are part of the picture. When all of them, flag States, ship breaking States 
and States with many ship owners, developed and developing, try to design a common 
instrument, the result will be the lowest common denominator with vague, weak rules on 
environmental protection such as the HKC. As shown in chapter 2.3, in the domain of ship 
breaking different instruments are applicable to different actors, thus creating loopholes, while 
the development and acceptance of an overarching international agreement, attempted in form 
of the HKC, has not been possible (yet). While such overarching comprehensive regime should 
be the ultimate goal, intermediate steps must be taken first. Therefore, regardless of the 
implementation of one international instrument the further development of the whole 
framework is important. The acceptance of a regime regarding ship breaking is higher in the 
EU, as shown by the implementation of the EU SRR long before the HKC could enter into 
force. The EU SRR should therefore include rules directed to EU owners, effectively hindering 
vessels owned by EU owners from being sold to breaking yards that are not included in the list. 
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This will curtail the braking yards’ business while easing the flag States’ sole responsibility, 
thus giving strong incentives to flag States and ship breaking States to accede to the HKC. With 
growing approval of the HKC, its provisions can be strengthened in the future. An international 
list approach such as in the EU SRR, executed by an independent organisation, should be the 
ultimate goal on the path to sustainable ship recycling. On the way there, the Basel Convention 
and its ban shall work as a catch mechanism for vessels that are not covered by the EU SRR. 
For the purpose of legal certainty, the text of the Convention should clarify that the sale of an 
end-of-life vessel to a broker fulfils the definition of ‘waste’.  
At this point it is important to note that the EU list facilities do not have the capacity to recycle 
all EU owned vessels. The EU list, which at this point, except for few facilities in Turkey and 
one in the US, almost only contains facilities in the EU,163 must be extended. 
4.2 Change the rules on FOC 
The second approach to the issue of less environmentally harmful ship breaking practices 
focusses on changing the framework around ship registry in general instead of changing ship 
breaking specific provisions. If the use of FOC was prevented or made more complicated more 
EU owners would be forced to register their vessels in the EU and would therefore be bound 
by the EU SRR.  
4.2.1 International law 
The issue of FOC could be tackled on an international level. Different measures come to mind 
such as the strengthening of the genuine link requirement in the LOSC or the establishment of 
a Registration Convention. 
Strengthening the ‘genuine link’ in the LOSC 
A possibility could be the strengthening of the genuine link in the LOSC. States could agree on 
certain criteria to be necessary to fulfil the genuine link requirement, such as the nationality of 
owners or crew. This, however, seems highly unlikely. As discussed, States have not been 
willing to adopt such rules even though it has been a topic of debate since the 1950s. Rather it 
has been restated by courts that the registration process stays under the States’ complete 
discretion and without requirements to the owner’s or crew’s nationality. Similarly, a non-
recognition clause might seem like an effective way to stop reflagging practices. However, 
there has been insufficient support within the international community. The reason for that is 
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that flagging of ships and their control is a central right of States which they do not want to give 
up. Further, the possibility of non-recognition would lead to chaos: Who decides which flags 
are not valid – each State for each foreign-flagged vessel in their maritime zones? What would 
that mean for vessels on the high seas? What if one State accepts the flag of a vessel and another 
does not – which nationality is valid? What would the consequence of non-recognition be – is 
the respective vessel stateless or does it have the nationality of the owners or the crew? If States 
could decide that a vessel is not of a certain nationality – could it then decide which nationality 
it is instead? All this could lead to the situation of multiple States trying to enforce jurisdiction 
on the same vessel or, the other extreme, no State feels responsible, and create an intolerable 
degree of legal uncertainty. According to article 92 LOSC  
(s)hips shall sail under the flag of one State only and (…) shall be subject to its 
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. 
This provision is an important cornerstone of the law of the sea framework. Ships sailing in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction must be subject to effective jurisdiction and control of a State. 
This is only possible if it is evident which State is responsible. The responsibility must be clear 
from an objective point of view – the flag the vessel is flying – and not be subject to evaluation 
by different States. From the point of view of legal clarity, a system of non-recognition would 
only work if it was conducted by an independent authority. However, as stated above, flag 
States want to maintain their discretion over their vessels. The establishment of an international 
authority on which States transfer discretion to accept or reject flag States is unlikely.  
Convention on the registration of ships 
Another possibility could be an international instrument on the registry of ships. In the 1980s 
States developed such instrument and created the United Nations Convention on Conditions for 
Registration of Ships.164 States, under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), defined the elements necessary to register a ship in a national 
registry, including, amongst others, provisions on the genuine link, ownership and role and 
accountability of the flag States.165 It is important to note how States had to compromise on 
many of the provisions in order to reach an agreement. The Convention’s provisions are not 
especially strict and flag State jurisdiction prevails: Article 8 for example regulates the 
ownership of ships flying a States flag. The Convention is unprecise and leaves it up to parties 
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to decide which form they should have. It is only required that States have national rules on 
ownership and that those 
should be sufficient to permit the flag state to exercise effective its jurisdiction and 
control over the ships flying its flag.166 
Article 9 of the Convention on manning is equally flexible. It provides that a State 
Shall observe the principle that a satisfactory part of the [crew] be nationals or 
persons domiciled or lawfully in permanent domicile in that State. 
The State shall also ensure that  
the manning of ships flying its flag is of such a level and competence as to ensure 
compliance with applicable international rules and standards.167 
Additionally, there is article 10. It prescribes that  
The State of registration, before entering a ship in its register of ships, shall ensure 
that the shipowning company […] is established or has its principle place of 
business within its territory. 
This provision seems to be a strong tie between registration and location of the owner. However, 
it is diluted in its second paragraph which provides that the company can be established in 
another jurisdiction as long as the company offers a natural or juridical person as a 
representative or management person who is national to or domiciled in the registering State. 
The Registration Convention has an obvious issue: It is not in force since the requirements of 
its article 19 have not been met – the instrument has not reached the 40 needed signatures,168 
and it has not managed to achieve those signatures in the past 34 years. That is the case even 
though the provisions in the instrument are not especially strict: Flag State jurisdiction still 
gives States great leeway and the rules are far from defining the genuine link requirement in a 
way which leaves flag States little room to maneuver. If this rather weak instrument could not 
enter into force, the development of another international instrument which would actually 
strengthen the genuine link by provisions on ownership or manning seems highly unlikely, if 
not impossible. 
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In conclusion, solving the issue of FOC on an international level seems improbable. Both States 
with many owners of the world fleet and top registering States want to keep the existing system 
alive. States have discussed the questions on defining more concrete standards regarding the 
genuine link by for example tying it to specific requirements such as ownership or residence 
for decades without reaching consensus. The entry into force of the 1986 Registration 
Convention or the adoption of a new instrument on the international level is not a probably 
solution. 
4.2.2 EU level 
The issue of FOC in the sector of ship breaking could be tackled on an EU level.  
4.2.2.1 Registration Regulation/ Directive 
Firstly, EU States could create an instrument on the EU level in which they develop obligations 
for EU owners regarding their registration. Rules could be created providing that if the owner 
is a company registered in a member State, its ships must be registered in the EU as well. 
However, the use of foreign flags has manifold reasons besides ship breaking and is a common 
practice. While demonstrating many legal issues such as tax evasion or the circumvention of 
environmental laws, there are a variety of legal reasons to fly a different flag. One of the basic 
pillars of the LOSC is that every ship must operate under a flag State’s jurisdiction which shall 
exercise effective jurisdiction and control. Over the past decades, while the genuine link 
requirement has been subject to controversial debates, one thing was clear early on: It is under 
the States’ discretion which ships they register. While stricter rules on the EU level might be 
desirable they would face strong headwinds from both the shipping industry and top registering 
countries. European owners benefit greatly from registering their vessels elsewhere. Under 
these factors it seems highly unlikely that an EU instrument could gain the necessary approval. 
It would ignore the realities of the market, when suddenly prescribing stricter rules on national 
registration without offering any advantages. Additionally, the EU does not even have the 
capacity to recycle all European owned vessels. The system of foreign registry has worked for 
a long time – and it has worked especially for EU member States. A sudden change of the 
system by an EU regulation or directive which prohibits the registry in foreign registers is not 
practicable; neither for registering States, nor the shipping industry or the EU who could not 
handle the stream of end-of-life ships. It is also very important to keep in mind that FOC are 
not only used relating to ship breaking but rather touch many other issues that cannot be 
evaluated in the scope of this thesis. An EU instrument on the registering of ships would change 
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the whole system of shipping. States must find a solution that not blindly prohibits reflagging 
but influences the ship breaking market in a sensible way, offering alternatives for the involved 
actors. 
4.2.2.2 Shipbreaking Fund 
A more sensible alternative is the development of a shipbreaking fund which could be a strong 
instrument to pave the way to a greener ship recycling industry. The ship breaking fund is a 
financial mechanism based on ships calling at EU ports, regardless of which flag vessels are 
flying. This might take away the reason to reflag just for the purposes of ship breaking and stop 
ship owners from circumventing the EU SRR. A starting point for the development of such 
fund is article 29 EU SRR: 
The Commission shall, by 31 December 2016, submit to the European Parliament 
and to the Council a report on the feasibility of a financial instrument that would 
facilitate safe and sound ship recycling and shall, if appropriate, accompany it by 
a legislative proposal. 
This is further mentioned in recital 19 of the EU SRR: 
In the interest of protecting human health and the environment and having regard 
to the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the Commission should assess the feasibility of 
establishing a financial mechanism applicable to all ships calling at a port or 
anchorage of a Member State, irrespective of the flag they are flying, to generate 
resources that would facilitate the environmentally sound recycling and treatment 
of ships without creating an incentive to out-flag. 
The current system of ship breaking relies on the fact that selling vessels to Asian ship breaking 
yards is cheaper than responsibly recycling in the EU. Major ship breaking yards save money 
by using non-environmentally friendly methods (such as beaching instead of the dry dock 
method), low expenses for labor and insufficient machinery.169 Therefore, they can offer high 
prices to ship owners. The aim of a financial incentive would be to minimize the owners’ profit 
gap between dismantling in substandard and EU list yards.170 
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2013 Proposal 
In 2013 the Environment Committee of the EU Parliament proposed a ship recycling fund based 
on a levy system collected by ports. However, the Parliament rejected the proposal.171 Reasons 
for that were the high administrative burdens for ports and the question if it was compliant with 
WTO rules and if it would be considered as a tax, which is outside the mandate of the EU.172 
2016 study 
A 2016 study by Ecorys, the Erasmus School of Law, and DNV GL173 proposed the instrument 
of an SRL. The scheme is supposed to work as follows: Ships calling at EU ports are required 
to hold a license, the SRL. Owners can acquire the license from a centralized EU agency for a 
minor administration fee under a public administrative legal instrument,174 which is thinkable 
either as a separate instrument or incorporated in the EU SRR. After that, the current ship owner 
is charged a premium, dependent on different factors, such as the type of the vessel, which is 
transferred to the shipbreaking fund.175 The premium charged over the years is calculated so 
that it will mirror the gap between recycling the ship in a facility included on the EU list or 
breaking it in a substandard yard. After proving that the vessel, after reaching the end of its life, 
was recycled in a facility that is included on the EU list and in compliance with the other 
provisions of the EU SRR the premiums are payed back to the ultimate ship owner.176 At this 
point it is important to note that the payments are tied to the ship, not to the owner.177 In the 
case that the ship is not recycled in compliance with the EU SRR, the paid premium is 
transferred to a general benefit fund in the area of ship recycling based on an administrative 
law procedure with the possibility for judicial review.178 
Evaluation 
The SRL as proposed in 2016 has strong advantages. In the current regime of ship breaking 
most owners think of how to dispose a ship when the ship is at the end of its life. They are then 
confronted with two options:  
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(1) The ship is sold to a non-EU broker while disguising the intent to dispose and/or 
while acting under a FOC. The broker then sells the ship to a substandard breaking 
yard and the owner obtains plenty of money for the sale 
Or (2) the owner decides to recycle the vessel at a responsible yard. This means the 
owner will not obtain money for the sale and possibly even end up paying for the 
disposal of hazardous waste.  
It is easy to understand why most ship owners make the economic decision and choose the sale 
to a broker or the operation under a FOC. The SRL has the potential to prevent these 
circumvention behaviors. Instead of facing the decision to either give millions of dollars away 
or recycle responsibly, owners will pay small premiums over the years. In the end the decision 
they face is a different one: They can either sell the ship to a substandard yard and obtain money 
for the sale or recycle it at an EU listed yard and receiving the paid premiums back. The second 
option has the advantage that the ship owner does not need to reflag the vessel or use other 
potentially complicated or cost intensive schemes such as the disguise of ownership to receive 
money. Further, by applying to all vessels calling in EU ports, regardless of their flag, EU 
owners are less inclined to circumvent the EU SRR’s or other instruments’ provisions by 
registering outside of the EU. This could constitute an important step in the direction of a 
framework that actually reaches all ships with strong links to the EU. Another advantage of the 
application to all vessels calling at EU ports is that it complies with WTO rules, namely the rule 
of non-discrimination. Payments from a fund could be seen as subsidiaries. In the proposed 
scheme however not only EU vessels can claim the payments but also foreign-flagged vessels 
and there is no discrimination.179 Further, compared to the 2013 proposal, the payments are not 
taxes. Rather they are premiums creating credit to the future payment of a capital amount, which 
will benefit the ultimate owner of the ship if it is recycled responsibly.180 If the vessel is broken 
in a non-EU list facility the owner will forfeit the credits to the future payment as a penalty.181 
There are, however, issues with the proposal. The first is that it will make operating costs for 
vessels higher. At this point it must be kept in mind that the SRL would apply to all vessels 
calling in at EU ports. Therefore, there is no distortion of competition or disadvantage for 
certain actors while the slightly higher costs for the sake of a more environmentally friendly 
ship breaking industry are reasonable, especially because ship owners can get most of the 
money back. Besides that, there is a second, more problematic criticism of the proposal which 
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runs like a red thread through all developed countries’ attempts to create a more responsible 
framework for the ship recycling industry. The SRL is supposed to stop end-of-life ships from 
going to substandard breaking yards and have them recycled at facilities on the EU list instead. 
That is the only desirable long-term solution, protecting the environment and safety of workers. 
However, as stated before, for now the EU list almost solely contains breaking yards in the EU, 
and those do by far not have the capacity to handle the recycling of all EU owned end-of-life 
ships. This could create the issue that owners will want to recycle their vessels responsibly to 
receive their premiums back but will not be able do so because EU breaking yards are out of 
capacity or they would be year-long waiting periods before a ship can be recycled. This seems 
counterproductive because it takes away the incentive to scrap responsibly. It is also unfair – 
the EU cannot create this incentive to make owners scrap their vessels at listed yards and then 
not have the capacity to do so. If there is no capacity and a vessel cannot be recycled at a listed 
yard even if the owner wants to – does that mean the owner will not receive the payments from 
the fund? Therefore, the SRL needs mechanisms to deal with the situation when owners want 
to recycle responsibly but cannot because of a backlog based on the lack of facilities. Firstly, 
the EU needs to work on expanding their capacities to recycle ships. It also needs to work on 
authorizing facilities outside of the EU and participate in building/ enhancing those facilities to 
comply with the EU list’s requirements. For both those purposes the money from the general 
benefit fund could be used. Meanwhile, the instrument needs provisions that in cases when the 
owner is not at fault for delay or lack of capacities they can get their premiums back before the 
vessel has been recycled and that it is not their responsibility to store the vessel for years at 
their own cost. If the EU can guarantee this and continues working on the expansion of the EU 
list the SRL is a desirable instrument to make owners use more responsible practices without 
losing millions of dollars. 
4.3 Relation between the EU SRR and the SRL 
The proposals to address owners in the EU SRR and the SRL raise the question if both could 
co-exist. One might think that if the EU SRR addresses owners and prohibits them from 
breaking their vessels in sub-standard breaking yards the SRL as an incentive for owners would 
not be necessary – EU owners would be financially incentivized to do something they are 
legally obliged to do anyways. This argument can however not hold up for the following 
reasons. Firstly, it is still possible to disguise the real ownership in which case the EU SRR 
would not be applicable. Secondly it must be kept in mind that the SRL does not only apply to 
EU owners but to all vessels calling at EU ports. Its scope is wider. The application of the SRL 
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besides the prohibition of the EU SRR is also a good mechanism for the acceptance of changes 
in the market for the shipping industry. It is a softer instrument than the listing approach and 
takes the interests of vessel owners - who are an important lobby - into account. Another 
positive effect is the existence of the general benefit fund which can be used to bring forward 
the development of responsible recycling facilities. For these reasons the instruments do not 
contradict each other but rather complement each other and can work together. 
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5 Conclusion and Outlook 
This thesis has assessed the international regulatory framework around ship breaking applicable 
to EU ship owners and worked out its shortcomings before dealing with the question which 
changes are needed to make the disposal of vessels of EU ship owners more environmentally 
friendly. 
The current framework approaches the matter from different angles. States have developed 
multiple instruments at the global and regional level regulating different aspects, most 
importantly the Basel Convention and the EU WSR on transboundary movement of waste, and 
the HKC and its early EU transposition into the EU SRR.  
However, as assessed in chapter 2, this framework is far from perfect. The biggest shortcoming 
is that the instruments apply to similar issues while addressing different actors, thus leaving 
loopholes for certain scenarios, as assessed in chapter 2.3. None of the instruments addresses 
the real generators of waste, which are the ship owners, but instead put vague rules on port and 
flag States. Additionally, both the ban and the list face a practical problem: The facilities in the 
OECD or EFTA countries, or respectively the ones included in the EU list, do not have the 
capacity to recycle all EU owned vessels. Further, the international community developed the 
HKC, which is supposed to constitute an overarching ship recycling specific instrument. The 
HKC, however, does not offer a sufficient framework to face the issues of ship breaking, as its 
rules are not strict enough and it incorporates neither a ban nor a listing approach, nor does it 
prohibit beaching. And, more importantly at this point, it has not entered into force, thus not 
even taking its weak effects.  
This less than ideal situation is made even worse by EU owners evading their responsibilities 
by disguising their intent to dispose end-of-life ships or reflagging their vessels to FOC which 
are not bound by the existing rules, as discussed in chapter 3. 
As discussed in chapter 4 solutions are needed which reach the real generators of waste, the 
ship owners, and hold them accountable, instead of putting vague obligations on flag or port 
States which can be easily evaded. The end goal is one overarching international legal 
instrument regulating ship recycling in a comprehensive way, applicable to ship owner States. 
In order to pave the way to such overarching scheme the international community primarily 
needs to work on two mechanisms: 
Firstly, the EU SRR shall be amended so that its list approach is applicable not only on flag 
States but also on owner States. European owner States shall ensure that their nationals cannot 
export their vessels to facilities which are not included in the EU list. This will lead to the 
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drastic reduction of business in sub-standard breaking yards and substantively contribute to the 
ship breaking States’ willingness to accede to the HKC, making it enter into force and offer 
global ground rules. In the long run, with growing acceptance, the HKC shall then be amended 
to contain stricter rules, such as an international list approach under the watch of an independent 
authority, and the prohibition of the beaching practice. 
Secondly, to encourage EU owners to recycle their ships responsibly instead of reflagging and 
disguising their intent to dispose, the SRL shall be created, either as a separate instrument or 
incorporated in the EU SRR. Ship owners of vessels calling at EU ports would pay small 
premiums to a fund during the operation of the vessel. After responsible recycling the premiums 
are paid back to the ultimate owner, taking away the incentive to reflag the vessel – the sum 
which had been paid during the course of the vessel’s life and which the last owner then receives 
should mirror the gap between recycling the ship in a facility included on the EU list and 
breaking it in a substandard yard. 
A combination of those two main mechanisms is expected to lead to the implementation of the 
HKC as an overarching ship recycling specific instrument while preventing owners from 
evading the rules. Whilst these legal mechanisms take their effects, and more owners try to 
recycle their vessels responsibly, the EU must take practical steps as well. To make the rules’ 
implementation practically possible, the EU list, and in the future the HKC list, must be 
continuously extended while also expanding the European ship recycling capacity. At the same 
time, the EU shall (co)finance the development of environmentally friendly ship recycling yards 
in the developing world, to meet their obligations pursuant to the polluter pays principle.  
The international community has faced the issues around environmentally harmful ship 
breaking practices for a long time. It is especially intolerable how EU owners operate ships for 
decades, making large profits, to then in the end dispose of the vessels in the developing world, 
causing major environmental damage. What makes these practices even more unacceptable is 
that while there are rules on responsible ship recycling those are wilfully evaded. EU law 
makers must face their responsibility and put an end to those practices. The EU must take a 
leading role in making EU owners use responsible practices and must stop hiding behind weak, 
easily evadable rules on flag States anymore. The EU, as the real generator of a big part of the 
waste, must especially take a leading role in bringing forward the global framework on 
responsible ship recycling. In the future, the EU measures regarding the obligations for EU 
owners in the EU SRR and the development of an SRL on the basis of calling at EU ports could 
pave the way to an overarching global instrument on ship recycling, such as the HKC. This 
should be the EU’s main goal.
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